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Abstract 
We present a clean test of whether inequality in endowments affects contributions to a public 
good. It is a clean test because, to our knowledge, it is the first to control for possible 
endowment effects. We find that the key adverse effect of inequality arises because the rich 
reduce their contributions when there is inequality.  
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1. Introduction 
The effect of inequality in endowments on contributions to a public good has typically been 
studied by comparing behavior in a public goods game when endowments are equal with a 
game where endowments are unequal (e.g., Issac and Walker, 1988, Cherry et al , 2005, 
Anderson et al, 2008, and Keser et al, 2011). The evidence is mixed, but on balance 
inequality of endowment lowers contributions (Zelmer, 2003). This is potentially important 
because it suggests a micro underpinning for the macro-level observation connecting 
increasing inequality with worse economic performance (e.g. OECD, 2015, and Ostrey et al, 
2014).  
The difficulty, however, with this experimental evidence and the inference is that two things 
change when equality of endowment is compared with inequality: individual endowments 
and the degree of inequality. If people’s behavior responds to existence of inequality and to 
their endowment, then the comparison does not isolate the effect of inequality alone. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper to control for the possible individual endowment effect and 
so isolate cleanly the influence of inequality. 
We study voluntary contributions to a public good (VCM) in 3 person groups under two 
conditions. The equality condition gives everyone the same endowment. This common 
endowment varies: in one case it is 20 =VCM-20, one 50 = VCM-50 and another 80 = VCM-
80. The second condition has inequality: one person has 20, another 50 and the third has 80 
=VCM-20-50-80. To test for the effect of inequality, controlling for individual endowment, 
we compare the contributions of subjects with the same endowment in the equality and 
inequality conditions (e.g, people in VCM-20 with the person who has 20 in VCM-20-50-80, 
etc).
1
  
We find that the poor and middle (defined by their endowment) individuals contribute the 
same in their equal VCMs as they do in the unequal VCM. The rich, however, contribute less 
in the unequal VCM than in their equal VCM. We test whether this effect of inequality is 
sensitive to the total endowment by running two further inequality conditions. They preserve 
the inequality relativities above but change the total endowment to match the total in VCM-
20 and VCM-80: i.e., VCM-8-20-32, and VCM-32-80-128. The fall in the contribution of the 
                                                     
1
 The 4:1 ratio between the rich and the poor in our 3 person interaction is close to what is found in OECD 
countries for the ratio between the average incomes of the top 1/3 to the bottom 1/3.  
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rich relative to the poor is a robust pattern under inequality and this difference in behaviour 
drives a fall in overall contributions under inequality.  
This result is important for two reasons. First, it is a clean test of the influence of inequality 
per se in endowment on contributions to public goods. Second, as the lower contribution is 
due to the behavior of the rich, this kind of inequality poses a practical difficulty. To tackle 
inequality through the tax system requires increasing taxes on the rich and lowering them on 
the poor. However, since, in effect, the contribution to the public good in the experiment is a 
decision about how much to tax oneself, the experiment shows that these are exactly the 
circumstances when the rich are less inclined to tax themselves (at least for public goods) 
even as highly as others, let alone more highly.  
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Subjects played a repeated linear public goods game (VCM) in groups of three. Each subject 
received an endowment of tokens to allocate between a private and a group account. Return 
from the private account was 1. For each token allocated to the group account, each member 
of the group earned 0.5 tokens, i.e., MPCR = 0.5. Each round, each subject was informed of 
his/her group’s total contribution and his/her individual earning from the round.  
We ran six treatments. In three, all subjects of the group received the same per-period 
endowment: 20 in VCM-20; 50 in VCM-50 and 80 in VCM-80. In the remaining three, there 
is inequality. In VCM-8-20-32, one subject has an endowment of 8, the second 20, and the 
third 32. The total endowment is the same as VCM-20. Endowments were similarly unequal 
in the other two inequality treatments: VCM-20-50-80 and VCM-32-80-128 and their total 
endowments are the same as, respectively, VCM-50 and VCM-80.  
Table 1 summarizes the treatments.
2
 In all, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is zero 
contribution while the social optimum is full contribution. Both remain unchanged under 
finite repetition.  
Table 1. Treatments 
Treatment Endowments # groups 
VCM-20 20-20-20 11 
VCM-50 50-50-50 12 
VCM-80 80-80-80 11 
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 Data from the equality treatments were also used in Hargreaves Heap et al (2015).  
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VCM-8-20-32 8-20-32 11 
VCM-20-50-80 20-50-80 13 
VCM-32-80-128 32-80-128 12 
Total - 70 
Twelve to eighteen students from UEA were recruited for each session, totaling 210 students. 
In all treatments, the game was repeated for 20 periods. Subjects were anonymously and 
randomly assigned to fixed three-person groups (partner-matching). Subjects received printed 
instructions which were read aloud by an experimenter and they had to correctly answer a 
quiz before the experiment could start. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Token earnings were 
converted to cash at the rate of 150 tokens to £1 and a subject earned between £10 and £11 on 
average including a £2 show-up fee. 
3. Results 
Figures 1 and 2 provide a summary of the results focusing on % contributions.
3
  
Three things stand out. 
1. Contributions in VCM-20 and VCM-50 are indistinguishable from, respectively, that of 
those endowed with 20 and those with 50 in VCM-20-50-80 (Figure 1).  
2. Contributions in VCM-80 are higher than that of those endowed with 80 in VCM-20-
50-80 (Figure 1).  
3. The rich contribute less than the poor for every total endowment level, and this pulls 
down overall contributions under inequality cf. equality (Figure 2).  
                                                     
3
 The % contributions control for endowment effects across subjects with different endowment levels. The 
average (over 20 periods) % contribution across treatments with equality are not different: VCM-20 vs. VCM-
50 (p = 0.712); VCM-20 vs. VCM-80 (p = 0.533); VCM-50 vs. VCM-80 (p = 0.902). There are also no 
differences in any sub-period. 
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Figure 1. Average percent contributions by individual endowment level 
 
 
Figure 2. Average percent contributions by total endowment level  
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The tables below present statistical tests of these patterns. Table 2 compares the average 
(over 20 periods) individual percent contribution for each individual endowment level under 
equality and inequality (Table B1 in Appendix B presents the comparisons for various sub-
periods). There is no significant difference between equality and inequality for those with the 
20 and 50 endowments in any sub-period or overall. The average contribution is, however, 
always higher for those with an endowment of 80 under equality than inequality and this is 
statistically significant in the first five periods (62.88 vs. 32.31; p=0.024).  
Table 2. Average percentage contributions by endowment level  
  End20 End50 End80 
Equality VCM 44.04 49.86 51.27 
 
(26.60) (30.66) (28.75) 
  
  
VCM 20-50-80 49.00 50.49 33.05 
  (33.48) (35.44) (29.46) 
p-values 0.664 0.957 0.164 
Standard deviations in parentheses. p-values for Ranksum tests.  #observations equal #groups in the treatment.  
 
Table 3 examines whether the aggregate difference between the rich under equality and 
inequality is supported at the individual level using panel random effects regressions on 
individual % contributions. The first equation has controls for the inequality treatment 
interacted with endowment levels to test for differences under inequality for each endowment 
level. The only interaction that is significant is the endowment of 80 and the coefficient is 
negative; the rich contribute a smaller percentage of their endowment under inequality than 
equality but the poor and middle endowment individuals contribute the same percentage 
under inequality as equality. Equation (2) adds the standard explanatory variables that are 
used in such regressions. Both variables are significant and take the expected signs; and the 
inequality interacted with 80 endowment remains negative and is still the only significant 
inequality variable. 
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Table 3. Individual Panel RE regressions: All treatments, all 20 rounds 
 Percentage contribution 
 (1) (2) 
Unequal group dummy 2.062 5.189 
 (10.72) (3.610) 
   
Unequal × End 20 dummy -1.492 -0.415 
 (5.513) (2.379) 
   
Unequal × End 80 dummy -17.44
***
 -8.484
**
 
 (5.705) (3.316) 
   
Lagged percent contribution  0.737
***
 
  (0.033)  
   
Lagged deviation from percent  -0.142
***
 
contribution of others  (0.018) 
   
Constant 62.74
***
 16.72
***
 
 (4.315) (3.432) 
Observations 2820 2679 
SE clustered on groups in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. Includes period dummies (not 
reported).  
 
Result 1. Controlling for individual endowment effects, contributions of the poor (20) 
and middle (50) are not affected by inequality. Contributions of the rich (80) decrease 
with inequality. 
 
We test for whether the difference between the rich and the poor under inequality is robust to 
changes in the total endowment in Table 4. It is. The average % contribution of the rich is 
significantly lower than the poor (and this is supported by analogous regressions to those in 
Table 3 in the Appendix Table B2).
4
  This pushes down the overall contribution for each total 
endowment level under inequality (cf. equality) and significantly so for the total endowment 
of 60 (p=0.0710) and 240 (p=0.0164), but not for 150 (p=0.4795).  
                                                     
4
 The comparison of the middle income individuals in each inequality treatment with their respective equal 
endowment VCM uniquely controls for both individual and total endowment effects. Their pooled contributions 
fall significantly from 48.43 on average under equality to 33.79 under inequality (p=0.0256). 
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Table 4. Average percentage contributions by total endowment level  
  Obs Group Poor Middle Rich p-values 
VCM 8-20-32 11 27.45 43.86 27.77 23.15 0.0366 
 
 (16.73) (29.41) (21.71) (16.93)  
 
  
 
   
VCM 20-50-80 13 40.99 49.00 50.49 33.05 0.0131 
   (30.05) (33.48) (35.44) (29.46)  
       
VCM 32-80-128 12 22.36 42.80 21.22 17.95 0.0060 
  (21.46) (37.03) (20.70) (21.57)  
Standard deviations in parentheses. p-values for sign-rank tests comparing poor and rich  
 
Result 2. The rich contribute significantly less than the poor under inequality for 
each level of total endowment and this lowers overall contributions under inequality 
cf. equality (significantly so for total endowment =60 and 240). 
4. Conclusion 
Our experiment is distinguished from those in the literature because it supplies what is to our 
knowledge the first clean test of whether endowment inequality affects contributions to a 
public good. We find, after controlling for endowments effects, that inequality critically 
affects the contributions of the rich. Their contributions fall when there is inequality as 
compared with equality. This is important not only because it identifies an adverse 
consequence of inequality, it also suggests a practical difficulty with reversing such 
inequality by increasing taxes on the rich. Since the contribution in our experiment is a 
decision to tax oneself to pay for a public good, our result means that it is exactly when you 
might want to tax the rich more highly, that the rich would actually prefer to pay lower taxes 
than everyone else. 
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